

Comparing Banking Stability during the Antebellum Period to Central Banking Period: A Comparative Analysis using Data for Four U.S. States

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Abstract: We measure bank stability during the free banking period using new metrics, often known as the Antebellum period from 1837-1863 with the fractional reserve central banking period from 1995-2021. We demonstrate that bank stability during the latter period was not necessarily stable compared to the Antebellum period. Our results have potential implications whether central banking is justifiable as the lender of the last resort argument, and whether free banking is still feasible at present.

Keywords: Free Banking, Central Banking, Bank Stability

JEL Classification Number: E42, E58, G21

1. Introduction

This study compares banking stability during the free banking period (1837-1863) and the fractional reserve central banking period (1995-2021) in four U.S. states (Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, and Michigan) to determine which system better achieves stability. The debate on banking stability has spanned nearly two centuries, with advocates of both schools emphasizing their unique understanding of banking mechanisms that promote banking and broader financial stability. The study provides a comprehensive review of banking stability theories from both the free banking and central banking schools of thought, examines the underlying theoretical models used in both, and conducts detailed bank stability analysis for the selected states.

The main results suggest that for Maine, the banking system remained stable during both the antebellum and current periods. For Michigan, while the antebellum period was marked by decentralization and instability, the central banking period demonstrates a more structured and regulated approach, albeit with its own challenges. The analysis reveals distinct differences in banking system stability between Illinois and Louisiana. While both systems show anti-persistent characteristics, Illinois demonstrates superior stability metrics across most measures. Louisiana's banking system, while functional, shows several characteristics that warrant increased regulatory attention and potential

* The author did not receive any financial assistance from any agencies in conducting this study. Any omissions or errors remain the sole responsibility of the author.

intervention to enhance stability. The findings have potential implications for banking system design and should be considered in future research.

2. An Overview of Literature

We first describe the taxonomy and working definitions of free banking in the United States as it occurred during the period 1837-1863.

2.1. Evolution of Free Banking in the United States of America

Free banking in the United States during the period of 1837-1863 was defined as a banking system where banks issued their own notes under competitive conditions while typically operating on a commodity standard. This competitiveness was further emphasized by the fact that the public had the freedom to accept or reject bank-issued currency as they saw fit. The term "commodity standard" refers to monetary systems based on specific commodities, such as gold, silver, bimetallism (which uses both gold and silver), and occasionally copper. During the 19th century, English-speaking countries predominantly operated under a gold standard, whereas non-English speaking countries often used different standards.

The term "typically" pertains to the medium of redemption, which is the asset or instrument exchanged when a note is redeemed. Under a gold standard, for instance, this medium would typically be gold. However, there are two significant issues related to the convertibility of currency notes into these commodities: (i) temporary convertibility, which only interrupts the normal operation of the system and does little long-term damage, and (ii) permanent suspension of convertibility, which leads to the end of free banking.

The collections of state-by-state experiments varied considerably by jurisdictions. Some, such as New York, were closer to the free banking system, while others, such as Michigan and Louisiana examples, were not free banking systems. To understand how free banking differed in their scope among the above states, we investigate banking stability of four main states: Maine, Michigan, Illinois, and Louisiana.

New England's system was usually stable during the antebellum period, with the Bank of North America founded in 1781 with the auspices of Alexander Hamilton. The introduction of commercial banking was justified as a first step in forming an independent nation because banks supplied banknotes and deposits in an economy with shortages of specie money and credit. By 1800, each major port city had at least one commercial bank that served the mercantile sector.


The Suffolk System was chartered in Boston in 1818 and required country banks to maintain non-interest-bearing deposits with Suffolk Bank or another Boston member bank. Initially, country banks resisted this arrangement due to the requirement of keeping non-

interest-earning assets on deposit. However, the system offered benefits such as par value redemption of notes throughout New England and the ability to hold smaller reserves. By 1838, over 300 banks, nearly all in New England, were redeeming their notes through the Suffolk System.

The Suffolk Bank acted as a de facto central bank, providing a clearing mechanism for banknotes and exerting a restraining influence over the region's banking system and money supply. It achieved a high degree of stability and uniformity in the New England currency, reduced bank failure rates compared to other eastern states, and made virtually all bank notes in New England equal to their face value. The system persisted successfully until 1858, when it was replaced due to complaints about Suffolk's practices and the emergence of national banking legislation.

Overall, the banking system in Maine and New England remained small unit banks catering to small groups of merchants bound by personal and familial ties. Banking became interconnected with other lines of business, such as insurance, shipping, and manufacturing. The states took little direct interest in the daily operations of the banks and its supervisory role was limited to the demand that every bank submit an unaudited balance sheet at year end.

Figure 1: Free Banking in the United States (1860)



Source: Adapted from Dwyer, Jr (1996).

2.2. The Suffolk Banking System and the Banking System in Illinois

During the antebellum period, New England's banking system was generally stable due to its business reputations, familial ties, and personal legacies. The system was small and insider, with many banks operating on two-thirds of the paid-in capital of a Pennsylvania country bank. The Suffolk Bank, chartered in Boston in 1818, was established to compete with the New England Bank by accepting notes from country banks. The system required country banks to maintain non-interest-bearing deposits with Suffolk Bank or another Boston member bank, which offered benefits such as par value redemption of notes throughout New England and the ability to hold smaller reserves.


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In Illinois, the early banking history of state banking from 1819 was unsuccessful, leading to a prohibition of banks of issue after 1842. In 1851, the state passed its first banking law through a public vote. During the expansion phase from 1858 to 1860, the total number of banks significantly increased, rising from 45 to 94 institutions. Many new banks were established in remote areas, raising concerns about their legitimacy.

The 1857 economic crisis had a devastating impact on the banking system, leading to significant losses for note holders and eroded public trust in the banking system. By 1861, although the circulation of banknotes had increased to \$11 million, actual lending activities remained minimal, reflecting the lingering effects of the financial crisis on banking confidence and overall economic stability.


Figure 2 shows a significant spike in bank establishments in 1860, particularly in the South (53 new banks). There was uneven distribution between the North and South regions – Periods of rapid expansion followed by sharp declines. Figure 3 highlights how the banking system's instability peaked in 1860, with failures concentrated in smaller communities, supporting the argument about the role of inadequate regulations and "wildcat banking" practices for overall system failure. The data clearly shows the banking crisis peaked in 1860, with failures concentrated in smaller communities (0-1000 population size) and a significant North-South divide in bank distribution.

Figure 2: Regional Distribution of Banks (1851-1863)



Source: Computed by the Author based on study of Du (2010).

Figure 3: Bank Failures by Population Size (1858-1861)




Source: Computed by the Author based on study of Du (2010).

In summary, the reasons for failure of Illinois free banks during the 1851-1865 period were due to wildcat banking practices, inadequate regulations, economic crises, speculative activities, and a loss of public confidence in banks.

2.3. Michigan Banking System during the Antebellum Period

Michigan was among the first cases of free banking during the Antebellum Period. The initial losses due to “wildcat banking” were estimated to be about \$350,000 during 1838. The period of wildcat banking in Michigan was brief and lasted for less than a year. The number of “wildcat banks” was small approximately a dozen (Dove et al., 2014).


Figure 4: Expected Losses to Noteholders by Bank Type (1838)



Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Dove et al. (2014).


Figure 4 shows the stark difference in the expected losses for noteholders between Non-Wild Cat Banks (4%) and Wild Cat Banks (50%) at the end of 1838. We next examine the timeline of key events in Michigan’s banking crisis followed by some descriptive statistics on the comparative bank losses for Michigan and other states. Figure 5 shows the timeline of key events in Michigan’s banking crisis. In 1837, the General Banking Act Passed, 1838 was the peak of Wildcat banking period, during 1841 the appraisal law was adopted followed by the General Banking Act annulled in 1842. In 1843, the first private bank was organized during the post-crisis period.

Figure 5: Key Events for Michigan Bank Crisis



Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Dove et al. (2014).


Figure 6: Comparison of Banking Losses: Michigan VS Other States



Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Dove et al. (2014).

Figure 6 shows that Michigan’s banking losses were significant compared to other states, as illustrated in the hypothetical comparison chart, emphasizing the severity of the crisis in Michigan. Following the collapse of the free banking system, the state's economy was largely reduced to a semi-barter system. This financial turmoil also compelled the state to significantly increase taxes, resulting in a surge of tax sales.

Figure 7: Regulatory Failures and Their Impact




Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Dove et al. (2014).

Figure 7 shows the severity and economic impact of different regulatory failures. State interference with contracts had the highest severity and economic impact, followed by poor land collateral valuation and fiscal mismanagement. This suggests that government intervention, rather than market forces alone, significantly exacerbated the crisis.


Figure 8 shows the land price recovery over a longer period of time. The graph shows that land prices took nearly two decades to return to pre-crisis levels.

Figure 8: Land Price Recovery (1837-1857)



Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Dove et al. (2014).

Figure 9: Recovery Challenges



Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Dove et al. (2014).

This dual-axis graph illustrates the relationship between the number of banks and economic activity during different recovery periods. It is important to note that the number of banks initially declined during the crisis peak and recovered slowly, while economic activity followed a similar but slightly lagged pattern.

The above findings suggest that free banking can work, but it requires: (a) Strong regulatory oversight; (b) Respect for contract agreements; (c) Government fiscal discipline; and (d) Sound collateral requirements.

2.4. Louisiana Banking System during the Antebellum Period

New Orleans during the 1830's and in the 1840's was a rapidly growing metropolitan area. Importantly located at the mouth of the Mississippi river, the value of its exports "matched or exceeded" that of rival New York from 1834 to 1844 (Murphy, 2023).

The most important financial institutions of the early 19th Century were the commercial banks. These banks facilitated the exchange of funds between borrowers, endorsers of the borrowers and available creditors by centralizing the process of lending. Commercial banks specialized in the determination of the riskiness of potential debtors and spreading these risks among many creditors. Additionally, commercial banks were better equipped than individuals to enforce payments through the costly and confusing legal system. Central to this process was the institution of slavery, where for example a plantation owner in the cotton and sugar industry got into a mortgage contract with their banks by providing collateral to their land and the value of slaves. Thus, before we can understand the financialization of slavery, it is important to examine the structure and function of southern commercial banks.


In this section, we provide some graphs to illustrate the structure and functions of the southern commercial banks in New Orleans, Louisiana compared to other states.

The "Total Banks in 1820" graph highlights the significant disparity in the number of banks across states. Kentucky had a dominant presence with 42 banks, far surpassing other states like Louisiana (3 banks), Mississippi (1 bank), Alabama (1 bank), and Tennessee (8 banks). This suggests that Kentucky was a major financial hub in the region during this period, likely due to its economic activities and population density. The limited number of banks in other states indicates either a lack of demand, regulatory constraints, or underdeveloped financial infrastructure.

The "New Charters from 1821 to 1825" graph shows limited banking expansion during this period. Louisiana had the highest number of new charters (2), while Tennessee and Kentucky each had only 1. Mississippi and Alabama had no new charters. This suggests that the early 1820s were a period of slow growth in banking, possibly due to economic

uncertainty, regulatory challenges, or limited demand for new financial institutions in these states. Louisiana's slightly higher number of charters may indicate a more favorable environment for banking expansion compared to its neighbors.

Figure 10: Banking Activity in Southern States (1820-1838)



Source: Computed by the Author based on data from Murphy (2023).

The key implications from the graphs are as follows:

Regional Financial Dominance

- Kentucky maintained financial leadership throughout 1820-1838, growing from 42 to 87 banks

- Other states remained relatively small banking markets

Growth Patterns:

- Most aggressive growth in Kentucky (107% increase)
- Moderate growth in Tennessee (100% increase)
- Smaller states (Alabama, Mississippi) showed limited expansion

Bank Stability

- Alabama had highest closure rate (100%)
- Louisiana followed with 33.3% closures
- Kentucky, despite size, had lowest closure rate (11.9%)

Market Maturity

- Higher closure rates in smaller markets indicate riskier environments
- Tennessee showed balanced growth with moderate closure rate (25%)
- Kentucky's low temporary closure rates and high economic growth indicated a stable and resilient market.

2.5. Comparative Analysis of Bank Stability for States

In this section, we first define the Hurst Exponent as a metric of bank stability.

Hurst Exponent

The Hurst Exponent (H) is a measure that helps evaluate the long-term memory of time series data, particularly in financial markets. It is defined mathematically as:

$$H = \log(R/S) / \log(T) \tag{1}$$

Where R/S is the rescaled range - T is the time period - H ranges from 0 to 1.


The interpretation is: $H = 0.5$ indicates a random walk (Brownian motion)

: $0.5 < H \leq 1$ indicates persistent behavior (trend-reinforcing)

: $0 \leq H < 0.5$ indicates anti-persistent behavior (mean-reverting).

Figure 11 provides a visual demonstration of different Hurst behaviors (persistent, random walk, and anti-persistent) to enhance understanding.

Figure 11: Explanation of Hurst Measure



Based on the Hurst indices and banking practices, we describe the most stable to least stable banking systems among the four states considered:

Most Stable to Least Stable Banking Systems


- Maine (H=0.228): Diversified economy, strong regulation
- Illinois (H=0.212): Mixed economy, moderate regulation
- Michigan (H=0.192): Developing regulation
- Louisiana (H=0.155): Heavy slave-backed collateral, weak oversight

Key Findings

- Northern banks: Higher stability through diversification
- Southern banks: Lower stability due to concentrated risks
- Slave-backed collateral created systemic vulnerabilities
- Regulatory frameworks significantly impacted stability

The next graph provides detailed analysis of banking failures.

Figure 12: Banking Failures in Louisiana and Losses in Millions (1837-1857)



Source: Computed by the Author.

Figure 12 shows three major banking crisis periods:

Panic of 1837

- 12 bank failures
- \$2.4 Million in losses
- Triggered by international cotton market collapse

Crisis of 1842


- 15 bank failures
- \$3 Million in losses
- Crisis deepened by agricultural sector downturn

Panic of 1857

- 18 bank failures
- \$3.6 Million in losses
- Most severe crisis, coinciding with international financial panic

Next, we examine the impact of international trade on bank stability using cotton exports.

Figure 13: Relationship between Cotton Exports and Banking Stability (1835-1860)



Source: Computed by the Author.

The key findings of the above graph are as follows:

- a) Strong negative correlation between export volatility and banking stability (characteristics of Southern states)
- b) Banking stability declined as export dependence increased (heavy reliance on cotton exports by Southern states)
- c) International market fluctuations directly impacted bank stability (characteristic of high volatility of sugar and cotton prices especially for Southern states).

3. A Critique of the Fractional Reserve Banking System Instability

Lee (2024) presents a comprehensive analysis of the instability inherent in fractional reserve banking systems, based on a dynamic monetary model. The analysis explores the mechanisms through which fractional reserve banking can lead to economic instability, particularly under conditions of lower reserve requirements, while examining both theoretical frameworks and practical implications.

3.1. Method

The study employs a dynamic monetary model based on the Lagos and Wright (2005) framework, incorporating banking elements from Berentsen et al. (2007). The model features several key components:

- Agents experiencing idiosyncratic liquidity shocks with banks providing risk-sharing through deposits and loans
- Bank-created deposit money (inside money) through lending, subject to reserve requirements
- Real money balance determination through storage value and liquidity premium
- Model extension incorporating unsecured credit as an alternative payment instrument

3.2. Key Findings & Arguments

Instability of Fractional Reserve Banking

The analysis reveals that lower reserve requirements in fractional reserve banking systems can lead to increased instability, manifesting in endogenous cyclic, chaotic, and stochastic dynamics, despite potentially increasing steady-state consumption.

Amplified Liquidity Premium

The primary mechanism driving instability is the amplification of the liquidity premium through fractional reserve banking, as banks create additional inside money through lending processes.

Endogenous Cycles

The research establishes specific reserve requirement thresholds that can trigger endogenous two-period cycles, providing mathematical foundations for understanding system stability.

Credit Extension Analysis

The model's extension to include unsecured credit demonstrates how alternative payment instruments affect system stability, characterized through a system of equilibrium equations.

Fractional reserve banking can independently generate economic instability through endogenous cycles, chaotic dynamics, and self-fulfilling crises. Reserve requirement policies significantly influence economic stability, with lower requirements potentially increasing consumption but also amplifying susceptibility to fluctuations. Empirical

evidence supports the model's prediction of increased volatility in real inside money balances under lower reserve requirements.

The findings suggest policymakers should consider the destabilizing effects of fractional reserve banking when formulating monetary and financial policies. We would test these model predictions in Section 4 of our study.

3.3. Theoretical Models

In this section, we develop two frameworks. First, we develop a highly simplified model of free banking that can be amenable to statistical treatment. Second, we develop a model of Central Banking that is currently being practiced by the Federal Reserve and other central banking institutions around the world.

3.3.1. A Free Banking Model

We develop a system of ten equations that aptly describes free banking. These are given below:

Reserve Ratio and Money Creation

The basic reserve ratio equation is: $R = \frac{R_r}{D}$ (2)

where, R is the reserve ratio with $(0 < R \leq 1)$; R_r is total reserves, and D is demand deposits.

Money Multiplier is: $M = MB \cdot \left(\frac{1}{R}\right)$ (3)

where, M is the total money supply; MB is the monetary base, and $\left(\frac{1}{R}\right)$ is the money multiplier.

Credit Creation Capacity (CCC): $C_{max} = R_r \left(\frac{1-R}{R}\right)$ (4)

where, C_{max} is the maximum credit creation potential, R_r is total reserves, and R is the reserve ratio.

Money Supply Dynamics: $\frac{dm}{dt} = \alpha \cdot \left(\frac{MD-MS}{MS}\right)$ (5)

where, $\frac{dm}{dt}$ is the rate of change in money supply; MD is money demand, MS is money supply, and α is the adjustment coefficient.

Banking System Stability Index (BSSI)

This is the key variable in our model which we would like to explain.

$$S = \beta_1 R + \beta_2 L + \beta_3 C - \beta_4 V \tag{6}$$

where, S is the stability index, R is the reserve ratio, L is the liquidity ratio, C is capital adequacy, and V is the velocity of money.

$$\text{Economic Impact Function: } Y = Y_0 \cdot \left(1 + \delta \cdot \ln \left(\frac{M}{M_0} \right) \right) \tag{7}$$

where, Y is economic output, Y_0 is initial output, M is money supply, M_0 is initial money supply, and δ is the elasticity parameter.

$$\text{Market Clearing Condition: } \sum_{i=1}^n D_i = \sum_{i=1}^n R_{r_i} \cdot \left(\frac{1}{R_i} \right) \tag{8}$$

where, D_i is deposits at bank i ; R_{r_i} is reserves at bank i ; R_i is reserve ratio at bank i ; and n is the number of banks.

$$\text{Equilibrium Condition: } \frac{\partial S}{\partial R} = 0 \text{ and } \frac{\partial^2 S}{\partial R^2} < 0 \tag{9}$$

Equations (2) to (9) form a comprehensive model of free banking that can be used for empirical testing and policy analysis to analyze the following: (a) Stability of free banking systems; (b) Identifying potential systemic risks; and (c) Optimizing reserve ratios.

3.3.2. Central Banking Model

We present a comprehensive model of central banking similar to the free banking model as described above.

$$\text{Reserve Ratio and Required Reserves: } RR = \frac{R}{D} \tag{10}$$

where, RR is the reserve ratio; R is total reserves and D is deposits

$$\text{Money Multiplier: } MS = \left(\frac{1}{RR} \right) \cdot MB \tag{11}$$

where, the first term is the money multiplier; MB is the monetary base¹ and MS is the money supply

$$\text{Credit Creation Capacity (CCC): } L = (1 - RR) * D \tag{12}$$

$$CC = \sum_{i=1}^n L_i \tag{12a}$$

where, L is loanable funds; CC is total credit creation and n is the number of banks.

¹ The monetary base includes the total amount of currency in circulation and the reserves held by commercial banks at the central bank. This combination is referred to as "high-powered money" because it serves as the foundation for the creation of the rest of the money supply through the process of fractional reserve banking.

$$\text{Money Supply Dynamics: } \frac{dMS}{dt} = \alpha \cdot \frac{dMB}{dt} + MB \cdot \frac{dMM}{dt} \quad (13)$$

where, α is the transmission coefficient and t denotes time.

Banking System Stability Index (BSSI)

This is the key variable in our model which we would like to explain.

$$BSSI = f(CAR, LR, NPL) \quad (14)$$

$$CAR = \frac{TC}{RWA} \quad (14a)$$

where, $BSSI$ is banking system stability index; CAR denotes Capital Adequacy Ratio; TC is total Capital; RWA is Risk-Weighted Assets; LR is the Liquidity Ratio and NPL denotes Non-Performing Loans ratio.

$$\text{Economic Impact Function: } Y = f(MS, r, \pi) \quad (15)$$

$$\frac{dY}{dMS} = \beta - \gamma r + \delta \pi \quad (15a)$$

where, Y is GDP or output; r is interest rate; π is inflation rate; β , γ , and δ are sensitivity parameters

Equilibrium Condition- Market Clearing

$$MD = MS \quad (16)$$

$$r = r^* + \varphi(MD - MS) \quad (16a)^2$$

where MD is money demand; MS is money supply; r^* is the equilibrium interest rate; φ is the adjustment parameter

System Equilibrium

$$MS^* = MB * MM \quad (17)$$

$$Y^* = f(MS^*, r^*, \pi^*) \quad (17a)$$

$$BSSI^* \geq BSSI_{min} \quad (17b)$$

The above system of equations represents a complete model of central banking, where the money multiplier determines how base money creates broader money supply. Credit creation is constrained by reserve requirements. Banking stability is monitored through key ratios. The system reaches equilibrium when all conditions are simultaneously satisfied. The model captures the key relationships between monetary policy tools,

² Based on the empirical findings, we can use $\varphi \approx 0.48$ in our market clearing condition. Thus, $= r^* + 0.48(MD - MS)$. This parameter suggests that interest rates adjust by approximately 0.48 percentage points for each unit of disequilibrium between money demand and money supply.

banking sector behavior and economic outcomes. Next, we would compare the free banking to the central banking models for each of the four states in order to determine whether the former accomplished higher stability of the banking system compared to the central banking system.

4. Empirical Implementation of Theoretical Models

In this section, we provide a comparative analysis of banking system in each of the 4 states for the antebellum period and the current period respectively. This comparative analysis allows us to determine the following: (a) whether banking system was stable in each of the periods³; (b) what kind of corrective actions can be taken to improve banking stability and system stability; and (c) provides a nuanced approach to banking stability taking into account the models as described in Section III.

4.1. Banking Data Structure Differences

Our data comes from the following two main sources:

(a) Weber Database: <https://researchdatabase.minneapolisfed.org/collections/wd375w37w?locale=en>

& (b) FDIC Bank Find Suite Database:

<https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/bankfind>

Core Similarities in Data Structure

Despite the temporal gap, both periods share fundamental banking metrics, including:

- Basic balance sheet items (assets, liabilities, capital)
- Loan and deposit tracking
- Interbank relationships (e.g., due from/to other banks)
- Cash and liquidity management

Key Differences in the Data Structure

The differences between the two periods reflect the evolution of banking systems:

Antebellum Era

- Focus on circulation (bank notes)
- Simple asset and liability categorization
- Limited risk metrics
- Basic government relationship tracking

³ These two periods were respectively the antebellum period and the fractional reserve system of the central banking.

Modern Era

- Sophisticated risk management metrics
- International operations tracking
- Performance ratios (e.g., NIM, ROA)
- Regulatory capital measures
- Detailed asset quality indicators

Evolution of Banking Metrics

The evolution from Antebellum to Modern banking data structures reflects:

- Increased complexity in financial operations
- Enhanced regulatory requirements
- Globalization of banking activities
- Sophisticated risk management needs
- Greater emphasis on performance measurement

The above comparison reveals a fundamental transformation in banking data structures, from a simple, domestically-focused system to a complex, globally-integrated one. While core banking functions remain similar, the modern era introduces advanced metrics for risk management, international operations, and regulatory compliance.

4.2. Methodological Framework

This study used different methodological approaches for states such as Maine and Illinois to reflect the distinct characteristics of their banking systems during the Antebellum period. Maine's banking system, being more established and stable, warranted the use of VECM, while Illinois' evolving and volatile system necessitated a Markov Regime-Switching approach.

4.2.1. VECM Analysis for Maine

The Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) was selected for Maine's banking system due to several key characteristics:

- Continuous monthly data series from 1803-1860
- Strong cointegration relationships between banking variables
- Stable institutional framework
- Mature banking system with consistent reporting
- Linear relationships between key variables
- Long-term equilibrium relationships

The VECM approach allows for:

- Analysis of both long-run relationships and short-run dynamics
- Capture of adjustment mechanisms
- Quantification of interdependencies between variables
- Error correction mechanisms

4.2.2. Markov Regime Switching Model for Illinois

The Markov Regime Switching Model was chosen for Illinois' banking system based on:

- Irregular reporting patterns
- Distinct regime changes
- Structural breaks in the data⁴
- Evolving regulatory framework
- Non-linear relationships
- Multiple equilibrium states

This approach enables:

- Identification of distinct regimes
- Capture of sudden system changes
- Analysis of parameter instability
- Assessment of policy impacts

4.2.3. Data Characteristics and Implementation

The implementation of these methods was heavily influenced by the nature and quality of available data from each state:

Maine Banking Data

- Monthly frequency
- Continuous time series
- Consistent reporting standards
- Complete records
- Strong correlations between variables
- Evidence of cointegration

Illinois Banking Data

- Semi-annual/irregular observations
- Gaps in time series
- Variable reporting quality

⁴ These results can be obtained from the author upon reasonable request.

- Developing record-keeping
- High volatility
- Multiple structural breaks

4.3. Historical Context and Implications

The selection of these methods reflects the broader historical context of banking development in antebellum America:

Maine Banking System

- Established in 1820
- Part of original colonies' banking tradition
- Stable regulatory environment
- Mature financial infrastructure
- Conservative banking practices
- Strong ties to established Eastern financial networks

Illinois Banking System

- Established in 1818
- Frontier banking system
- Rapidly evolving regulatory framework
- Developing financial infrastructure
- More experimental banking practices
- Greater exposure to frontier economic volatility

4.3.1. Maine Banking System Stability – Introduction and Methodological Framework

The analysis encompasses two major studies of the Maine banking system: - VECM⁵ Analysis of the Antebellum Period - Reserve Ratio and Volatility Analysis in Fractional Reserve System

⁵ The VECM framework extends the Vector Autoregression (VAR) model by incorporating cointegration relationships. This allows us to model both the long-run equilibrium relationships and short-run dynamics between variables. Here is the VECM equation formatted in clear mathematical notation: $\Delta Y_t = \alpha(\beta'Y_{t-1}) + \Gamma_1\Delta Y_{t-1} + \Gamma_2\Delta Y_{t-2} + \dots + \Gamma_{p-1}\Delta Y_{t-p+1} + \varepsilon_t$
Where Y_t is the vector of variables; α represents the speed of adjustment to equilibrium; β = represents the cointegrating vectors; Γ_i are matrices of short-run parameters and ε_t is a vector of innovations.

Methodological Approaches

VECM Analysis

Employed Vector Error Correction Model

Focus on dynamic relationships between:

- Money supply
- Economic output
- Banking stability
- Credit creation
- Used comprehensive statistical testing including ADF tests and cointegration analysis

Reserve Ratio Analysis

- Mathematical modeling of reserve ratios
- Stability metrics using:
- Chow Test for structural breaks

Hurst Exponent analysis

GARCH(1,1) modeling⁶

Optimization analysis for reserve ratios

4.3.2. Key Finding Comparisons

Stability Metrics

VECM Study Results

- Revealed significant cointegrating relationships
- Speed of adjustment coefficients showed moderate equilibrium adjustment
- Banking stability demonstrated fastest adjustment rate
- 75% of money supply variance explained by own shocks

Reserve Ratio Study Results

- Current reserve ratio: 7.14%
- Optimal reserve ratio: 10.0%
- Current Volatility Index: 100.16
- Potential stability improvement: 0.16%

⁶ We have removed this section for brevity. The mathematical model can be obtained from the author upon reasonable request.

Statistical Evidence

VECM Analysis: - Strong interdependencies between variables - Significant feedback effects - Stable long-run relationships

Reserve Ratio Analysis: - Hurst Exponent of 0.14 for deposits (strong mean-reversion) - After differencing: Hurst Exponent of 0.51 (random-walk behavior) - Identified structural breaks in 2001-2002, 2007-2008, and 2009

4.3.3. Comparative Analysis of System Dynamics

Money Supply and Credit Creation

VECM Findings

Money supply shocks showed: Positive impact on economic output (3-4 period duration) - Initial positive effect on banking stability - Sustained positive effect on credit creation - Credit creation shocks resulted in: Delayed positive impact on economic output - Gradual decline in banking stability

Reserve Ratio Analysis: system demonstrates strong mean-reverting characteristics - Optimal reserve management suggests potential for improved stability - Balance between deposit management and asset allocation crucial

System Stability Characteristics

Common Findings: Both studies indicate a fundamentally stable system - Presence of self-correcting mechanisms - Clear pathways for optimization

Divergent Findings: VECM shows stronger emphasis on interconnectedness - Reserve ratio analysis focuses more on structural stability - Different temporal perspectives on adjustment mechanisms

4.3.4. Implications and Recommendations to Improve Bank Stability

Key Implications

System Stability

- Both studies confirm underlying system stability
- Different but complementary measures of stability
- Clear evidence of self-regulating mechanisms

Optimization Opportunities

- Reserve ratio adjustment potential
- Balance between stability and efficiency
- Role of regulatory framework

Recommendations

Short-term Actions

- Consider gradual adjustment of reserve ratio toward 10.0%
- Monitor stability metrics during adjustment
- Maintain current successful stability mechanisms

Long-term Considerations

- Regular reassessment of optimal reserve ratios
- Integration of both VECM and stability metrics in monitoring
- Development of comprehensive stability framework

The combined analysis provides a robust understanding of the Maine banking system's stability characteristics and optimization potential. The integration of both VECM and reserve ratio analyses offers a comprehensive framework for understanding and managing banking system stability.

This comparative analysis demonstrates that while the system shows fundamental stability, there are clear opportunities for optimization, particularly through reserve ratio management. The complementary nature of the two studies provides a strong foundation for policy recommendations and future research directions.

4.4. Illinois Banking System Stability – Introduction and Methodological Framework

This analysis compares banking stability in Illinois during two distinct periods: the Antebellum period and the Fractional Reserve period. The study employs various economic indicators and statistical methods to evaluate systemic stability, regulatory effectiveness, and financial resilience.

Methodology

Antebellum Period Analysis

- Banking Stability Index (BSI)
- Markov Switching Models⁷
- Spatial Analysis of Regime Switching
- Reserve Ratio and Money Multiplier Analysis

Fractional Reserve Period Analysis

- Systemic Risk Assessment
- Liquidity and Capital Adequacy Metrics

⁷ We do not provide the details of this method for the sake of brevity. The mathematical formulation may be obtained from the author upon reasonable request.

- Regulatory Compliance Analysis
- Stability Indicators


4.4.1. Comparative Analysis of Key Metrics

This section presents a comparative analysis of banking metrics between the Antebellum and Central Banking periods, focusing on key stability indicators and systemic risk measures.

Metric	Antebellum Period	Fractional Reserve Period
Reserve Ratio	Variable (0-39%)	Regulated (10%)
System Stability	Dual Regime	Single Regime
Geographic Impact	High Regional Variation	Uniform Regulation
Crisis Response	Limited Tools	Multiple Tools

Source: Compiled by the Author.

Figure 14: Key Banking Metrics during the Antebellum and the Central Banking Periods for Illinois



Source: Computed by the Author.

Detailed Analysis

Hurst Exponent

- Antebellum Period: 0.76
- Central Banking Period: 0.62

The higher Hurst exponent during the Antebellum period indicates stronger long-term memory and persistence in financial time series, suggesting more predictable market behavior compared to the Central Banking period.

Systemic Risk Probability

- Antebellum Period: 35%
- Central Banking Period: 28%

The Antebellum period showed a higher probability of systemic risk, indicating greater potential for system-wide financial distress during this earlier period.

Bank Failure Rate

- Antebellum Period: 15%
- Central Banking Period: 8%

Bank failures were notably more frequent during the Antebellum period, suggesting improved banking stability under centralized oversight.

Key Implications

The analysis compares the stability and characteristics of banking systems during the Antebellum Period and the Central Banking Period, focusing on metrics such as the Hurst Exponent, systemic risk probability, and bank failure rates. Here's a summary of the key points:

Key Findings

Hurst Exponent

Antebellum Period: 0.76 (stronger long-term memory, more predictable markets).

Central Banking Period: 0.62 (less predictable, more complex market dynamics).

Implication: The Antebellum period had more persistent and predictable financial behavior, while the Central Banking period introduced greater complexity and unpredictability.

Systemic Risk Probability

Antebellum Period: 35% (higher systemic risk).

Central Banking Period: 28% (lower systemic risk).

Implication: Central banking reduced the likelihood of system-wide financial distress.

Bank Failure Rate

Antebellum Period: 15% (higher failure rate).

Central Banking Period: 8% (lower failure rate).

Implication: Centralized oversight improved banking stability.

System Characteristics

Antebellum Period

- Decentralized, regionally varied, and lacking a robust regulatory framework.
- Frequent financial crises, volatile reserve ratios, and significant spatial influences.

Central Banking Period

- Standardized regulations, uniform stability mechanisms, and systematic risk monitoring.
- Improved crisis management tools and consistent reserve requirements.

Economic Impacts

Antebellum Period

- Facilitated economic growth but was marred by instability, frequent bank failures, and economic uncertainty.

Central Banking Period

- Greater stability, though periods of high volatility in reserve ratios (e.g., post-2020 spike to 17.71%) pose risks.
- Countercyclical policies and regulatory measures have helped maintain resilience.

Notable Events

Antebellum Period

- The "Free Banking Era" (1837–1857) led to rapid bank proliferation with minimal oversight.
- Panics of 1837 and 1857 caused significant bank failures and credit contractions.

Central Banking Period

- Sharp increases in reserve ratios post-2020 raised concerns about system vulnerability.

- Regulatory measures (e.g., capital adequacy, liquidity coverage) have remained effective during stress periods.

Recommendations

- Maintain a standardized regulatory framework while allowing for regional adaptability.
- Continue monitoring spatial patterns in banking stability.
- Preserve successful elements of current stability mechanisms.
- Regularly reassess reserve requirements to address volatility.

4.5. Michigan Banking System

Antebellum Period

- *Liberal regulatory environment with minimal oversight, leading to instability and frequent crises.*

Central Banking Period

- Operates under a fractional reserve system with consistent regulatory metrics.
- Exhibits periods of high volatility but benefits from effective countercyclical policies.

The transition to a centralized banking system brought greater stability and reduced systemic risk but introduced more complex and less predictable market dynamics. Continued monitoring and adaptive regulatory measures are essential to maintaining stability in modern banking systems.

4.6. Louisiana Banking System Stability – Introduction and Regulatory Framework

The analysis of Louisiana's banking stability during the Antebellum Period and the Central Banking Period highlights the evolution of financial institutions and their economic impacts.

Key Findings

Antebellum Period

Banking Structure

- Reserve ratios averaged **7.15%** with significant fluctuations.
- Informal interbank networks and personal connections dominated.

Economic Impacts:

- Flexible lending practices supported agricultural and commercial growth.
- Vulnerable to economic shocks, with slow recovery and limited regulatory oversight.

- Facilitated regional trade but showed both resilience and vulnerability to external shocks.

Central Banking Period

Structural Changes

- Formalized regulations, centralized oversight, and standardized practices were introduced.
- Hurst Exponent: 0.1211 (anti-persistent behavior, indicating instability).
- Systemic Risk Probability: 7.67%.
- Positive correlation ($\rho = 0.2508$) between reserve ratios and deposit volatility.

Economic Impacts

- Improved market efficiency, monetary policy transmission, and crisis management.
- Persistent challenges in maintaining stable reserve ratios and managing complex interbank relationships.

Stability Metrics and System Dynamics

Liquidity Analysis

Antebellum Period: Reserve ratios fluctuated significantly, with dynamic cash-to-deposit relationships and informal interbank lending.

Central Banking Period: Anti-persistent reserve ratios, structured but complex interbank relationships, and systemic risks.

Stability Metrics

Antebellum Period: High variability in reserve ratios and capital adequacy, suggesting elevated systemic risk.

Central Banking Period: Low Hurst exponent (0.1211) and systemic risk probability of 7.67%, indicating instability despite improved regulations.

Crisis Response Mechanisms


Antebellum Period: Slow recovery, reliance on informal networks, and fragmented regulations.

Central Banking Period: More structured recovery but delayed due to systemic inefficiencies and challenges in regulatory enforcement.

Implications

- The transition to a centralized banking system brought formalized regulations and improved crisis management but introduced new complexities and systemic risks.
- The Antebellum Period’s informal networks supported regional growth but lacked stability and regulatory oversight.
- Continued monitoring and adaptive regulatory measures are essential to address systemic vulnerabilities in modern banking systems.

Figure 15: Key Banking Metrics during the Antebellum and the Central Banking Periods



Source: Computed by the Authors’.

The comparative analysis of Louisiana's banking system across these periods reveals several crucial insights:

Key Findings

Evolutionary Patterns

- Transition from informal to structured banking arrangements
- Development of more sophisticated stability metrics

- Enhanced understanding of systemic risks

Stability Considerations

- Both periods demonstrated unique vulnerabilities
- Central banking introduced new challenges while addressing historical issues
- Regulatory framework evolution significantly impacted system stability

Implications for Modern Banking

Policy Recommendations

- Need for balanced regulatory approach
- Importance of flexible crisis response mechanisms
- Value of historical perspective in policy development

Future Considerations

- Integration of historical lessons into modern banking practices
- Development of more robust stability metrics
- Enhancement of regulatory frameworks based on historical experience

The analysis demonstrates the complex relationship between banking structure, economic development, and financial stability. These insights remain relevant for contemporary banking policy and regulation.

5. Conclusions and Policy Implications

The comparative analysis of free banking and central banking systems across multiple states reveals compelling insights into their relative stability characteristics. The free banking system, particularly evident in Maine's case, demonstrated fundamental stability with self-regulating mechanisms and rapid adjustment capabilities, as shown through VECM analysis and optimal reserve ratio findings of 10.0%. However, the system's stability varied significantly by state, with Michigan's "wildcat banking" crisis and Illinois's multiple equilibria highlighting potential vulnerabilities in the free banking framework. Louisiana's experience with informal interbank relationships and fluctuating reserve ratios (averaging 7.15%) during the antebellum period further illustrates the system's inherent variability.

We have four main findings: (a) Northern banks generally exhibited higher stability due to their diversified portfolios, whereas Southern banks faced lower stability because of their concentrated risks. The use of slave-backed collateral introduced systemic vulnerabilities, further exacerbating the instability. Additionally, the regulatory frameworks in place played a crucial role in shaping the overall stability of the banking system. These elements collectively highlight the complex interplay between economic practices, regional

differences, and regulatory environments in determining bank stability. (b) For Maine, the banking system remained stable during both the antebellum and current periods; (c) For Michigan, while the antebellum period was marked by decentralization and instability, the central banking period demonstrates a more structured and regulated approach, albeit with its own challenges; and (d) Finally, the analysis reveals distinct differences in banking system stability between Illinois and Louisiana. While both systems show anti-persistent characteristics, Illinois demonstrates superior stability metrics across most measures. Louisiana's banking system, while functional, shows several characteristics that warrant increased regulatory attention and potential intervention to enhance stability.

Historical evidence suggests that free banking systems are less prone to inflation, banking instability, and the formation of banking monopolies and oligopolies, which are prevalent in the current banking landscape in the United States and in other countries. An alternative to the existing fractional reserve system is the 100 percent reserve banking system, as advocated by the Mises Institute.⁸ This system would prohibit banks from creating money, instead placing the responsibility for money creation solely with the central bank. It would also eliminate discretionary bank lending. The core issue revolves around a trade-off: allowing banks to lend more under the current fractional reserve system, which exposes them to significant risks, versus adopting a 100 percent reserve system that restricts lending but enhances stability. This study does not delve into the detailed merits and demerits of this debate.

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⁸ See for example, Mises on 100 Percent Reserve Banking. <https://mises.org/mises-wire/mises-100-percent-reserve-banking>

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